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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction to hear this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 782a-3(2)G).
STATEMENT REGARDING THE ISSUES
Appellees object for the following reasons to appellant's ability to appeal Issue
Number 1, and to the standard of review it suggests for each Issue.
Issue No. 1: Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 24(a)(5)(A) requires that an
appellant include in its statement of issues a "citation to the record showing that the issue
was preserved in the trial court." This reflects the basic rule that to preserve an issue for
appellate review, a party must first raise the issue in the trial court. See, e.g., DeBry v.
Cascade Enters., 935 P.2d 499, 501 (Utah 1984).
Appellant failed to raise before the trial court its argument that it was entitled to
summary judgment due to the failure of appellee, Thrifty Payless, Inc. d/b/a Rite Aid
("Rite Aid"), to respond to appellant's summary judgment motion. Appellant is therefore
barred from raising that issue for the first time on appeal.
Even if this Court should decide to address the issue, which Rite Aid addresses on
the merits in the body of its brief, the standard of review is the same standard required of
the trial court in deciding summary judgment motions: This Court should view the facts
in the light most likely to create factual questions. See, e.g., Estate Landscaping & Snow
Removal v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 844 P.2d 322, 324 n.l (Utah 1992).
Issue No. 2: In defining this issue, Hillside basically argues that Rite Aid's
exercise of its Option was contrary to the Lease as modified by later correspondence. To
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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the extent Hillside challenges the trial court's reading of written documents, the issue
presents a question of law that this Court reviews for correctness. See, e.g., Harris v. IES
Assocs. Inc., 2003 UT App. 112, f 27, 69 P.3d 297.
To the extent, however, that this Court "must rely on facts deduced from
testimony, [it defers] to the trial court's relevant findings of fact, by applying the clearly
erroneous standard of review, and resolve[s] any ambiguities in the evidence in favor of
the trial court's judgment." Provo River Water Users Assoc, v. Morgan, 857 P.2d 927,
931 (Utah 1993).
Issue No. 3: The issue here is not what the words of the Lease say, which would
involve a "correctness" standard of review.

Instead, the question in Issue No. 3 is

whether equity should excuse Rite Aid's mistake in interpreting the change of address
notice, assuming that the Court finds during its analysis of Issue No. 2 that Rite Aid did
indeed make a mistake. See U.S. Realty 86 Assocs. v. Security Inv., Ltd., 2002 UT 14, ^f
10, 40 P.3d 586 (" U.S. Realty now appeals, contending that the trial court erred as a
matter of law by refusing to equitably excuse it from strict compliance . . ."); Utah Coal
and Lumber Restaurant, Inc. v. Outdoors Adventures Unlimited, 2001 UT 100, ^ 10, 40
P.3d 581 ("The sole question on appeal is whether the trial court erred in equitably
excusing White Pine's failure to timely exercise its lease renewal option."); Geisdorfv.
Doughty, 972 P.2d 67, 71 (Utah 1998) ("[T]here are instances in which deviation from
strict compliance [with lease renewal provisions] may be equitably excused.").
Appellant erroneously claims that this issue is subject to a "correctness" standard
of review. To the contrary, the US. Realty 86 opinion makes clear that the issue of
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

equitable excuse constitutes a mixed question of law and fact. In such cases, courts
"grant broadened discretion to the findings of the trial court." U.S. Realty 86, 2002 UT
14, Tf 12 (emphasis added). As a consequence, the Court reviews this issue for abuse of
discretion:
The application of the facts to the legal standard of equitable estoppel is a
mixed question of fact and law. . . . Consistent with the Utah Supreme
Court's standard of review on the issue of waiver, we grant similar
broadened discretion to the trial court on the issue of equitable estoppel.
* * *

We assume that this overall view of the interaction between the parties led
the trial court to reject appellants' argument of equitable estoppel. We find
that it was within the trial court's discretion to so conclude. Accordingly,
we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion on this issue, and
affirm the trial court's determination that the doctrine of equitable estoppel
does not apply in this instance.
Trolley Square Assocs. v. Nielson, 886 P.2d 61, 66 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) (emphasis
added).
Issue No. 4: The interpretation of a contract to determine whether attorney fees are
recoverable is a question of law. See, e.g., Zions First Natl Bank, N.A. v. National Am.
Title Ins. Co., 749 P.2d 651,656 (Utah 1988). It is only the amount of the award that this
Court reviews for abuse of discretion. See, e.g., Richard Barton Enters, v. Tsern, 928
P.2d 368, 380 (Utah 1996).
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES,
ORDINANCES AND RULES
None.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
I.

NATURE OF THE CASE

This is a contract dispute involving the question of whether Rite Aid, as tenant,
effectively exercised its Option to renew a commercial lease agreement with appellant,
Hillside Plaza Ltd. d/b/a/ Hillside Plaza Properties ("Hillside"). During the initial lease
term, both parties amended the lease by providing alternate mailing addresses. Rite Aid
exercised its renewal Option by sending written notice by certified mail to Hillside at the
most recent address it had for legal notices. Hillside maintains that Rite Aid should have
sent its renewal notice to Hillside Management, Hillside's property manager, at a
different address, and that Rite Aid's failure to do so made the renewal untimely and
ineffective.
II.

COURSE OF THE PROCEEDINGS

Rite Aid filed a complaint in this action on December 14, 2000 requesting the trial
court to declare that (1) Rite Aid effectively exercised its Option by mailing its notice of
renewal to the correct address; or (2) if Rite Aid did not mail its notice of renewal to the
correct address, any error was equitably excused as the result of an honest and justifiable
mistake. The trial court denied cross motions for summary judgment submitted by the
parties, and after a bench trial entered judgment for Rite Aid.
III.

STATEMENT REGARDING THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS OF
RELEVANT FACTS

In the Statement of Facts in its initial brief, Hillside curiously cites its own
proposed findings of facts and conclusions of law, rather than the findings and
conclusions the trial court actually signed and entered, included herein as Addendum A.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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As a consequence, Hillside claims that the trial court made several findings that it in fact
did not make. These include the findings Hillside has numbered in its initial brief as
findings 13, 14, 21, 30 and 34-43 (R. 975-987).
At the same time Hillside includes 14 "findings" that the trial court refused to
make, Hillside omitted 19 findings that the trial court made and entered. Rite Aid
reproduces these omittedfindingsverbatim below:
25. At trial, Hillside presented no competent evidence that Hillside ever
sent the January 21, 1997 Letter to Rite Aid or anyone else (R. 981).
26. Hillside offered no evidence nor excuse explaining or justifying
Annette Johnson's failure to testify at trial (R.981).
Rite Aid Strictly Complied With Option Exercise Requirements
28. In writing Exhibit 3, Hillside Management intended to change the
mailing address for all purposes from [CPMC] to Hillside Management;
Exhibit 3, however, does not express that intention (R. 981).
29. Rite Aid was unaware of this intention until after August 4, 2000,
the deadline for Rite Aid's Option exercise (R. 981-82).
30. Because it changed the address for legal notice only on its PIMS
system, leaving the address for other correspondence unchanged, it is clear
that Rite Aid's predecessor-in-interest read Exhibit 3 as changing the
address for rent and rent-related activities only, leaving unaffected the
address contained in Exhibit 2 for correspondence not involving rent and
rent-related activities (R. 982).
33. The phrase "property management" may or may not mean "all"
activities involving the managed property (R. 982).
34. Under the evidence admitted at trial, it is of really small moment
whether Rite Aid read Exhibit 3 or not prior to sending Exhibit 5, because
Exhibit 3 makes reference only to the address for "rent", and not to other
types of correspondence, and therefore changed the address for rent only
(R.982).
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35.
Rite Aid's interpretation of Exhibit 3 as affecting only the address
for rent and rent-related correspondence was reasonable (R. 982).
1

36.
Hillside presented no evidence establishing that Rite Aid should be
charged with knowledge of its or Hillside Management's unexpressed
intent (R. 983).
37.
It would not have been difficult for Hillside Management to have
written a letter that clearly and unequivocally changed the address for all
types of notice; indeed its purported January 21, 1997 letter accomplished
that purpose (R. 983).

j

38.
The Court is not impressed with Hillside's arguments that it
repeatedly sent correspondence to Rite Aid containing the Sandy post office
box address because such correspondence was rent-related, and in many
cases merely requested that Rite Aid remit monies to the listed address (R.
983).

\

39.
To the extent Hillside wanted Rite Aid to correct the address it was
using, Hillside provided no explanation of its failure ever to send any
change of address notice to Rite Aid at the address it had specified in
Exhibit 4 as applying to legal notices (Attention: Secretary, Post Office Box
3165, Harrisburg, Pennsylvania) (R. 983).

<

Mistake
40.
Alternatively, Rite Aid interpreted Exhibit 3 in a manner
inconsistent with Hillside Management's intention (R. 983-84).
41.

Hillside Management prepared Exhibit 3 (R. 984).

42.
The change-of-address portion of Exhibit 3 deals only with urent" or
"rental" (R. 984).
43.
Hillside Management accordingly caused any confusion inherent in
Exhibit 3 (R. 984).
44.
It is not reasonable under the circumstances to charge Rite Aid with
knowledge of what was in Hillside Management's mind (R. 984).
45.
To the extent that Rite Aid addressed Exhibit 5 to the wrong address,
that error was the result of an honest and justifiable mistake in interpreting
Exhibit 3 (R. 984).
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46. No trial evidence showed that Rite Aid was negligent in exercising
the Option to renew the Lease (R. 984).
In summary, Hillside's purported "findings" nos. 13, 14, 21, 30 and 34-42 are
arguments, not findings. The trial court neither accepted nor entered any of those
"findings". In fact, it rejected them.
On the other hand, the trial court expressly found that (1) there was no evidence
that Hillside Management ever sent the January 21, 1997 letter included in Exhibit 55 to
anyone (Finding 25); (2) Exhibit 3 does not reveal Hillside Management's intent that all
future legal notices be addressed to Hillside Management (Finding 28); (3) Rite Aid was
unaware until after the expiration of the Option renewal date that Rite Aid was to send
renewal notices to Hillside Management (Finding 29); (4) Rite Aid's reading of Exhibit 3
was reasonable (Finding 35); (5) to the extent Rite Aid addressed Exhibit 5 to the wrong
address, that error was the result of an honest and justifiable mistake in interpreting
Exhibit 3 (Finding 45); and (6) no trial evidence showed that Rite Aid was negligent in
exercising its Option to renew the Lease.
Nothing has become more settled in Utah appellate jurisprudence over the last
decade than an appellant's duty to marshal evidence. If an appellant such as Hillside fails
to marshal the evidence supporting each challenged finding, this Court accepts the
finding as true and does not consider the appellant's argument. See, e.g. Lefavi v.
Bertoch, 2000 UT App 5, ^ 17, 994 P.2d 817 ("When an appellant fails to marshal the
evidence, we refiise to consider the merits of challenges to the findings and accept the
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findings as valid.") (citation omitted). Hillside has failed to marshal the evidence not
only on those critical findings, but generally on all the findings that Hillside challenges:
The marshaling process is not unlike becoming the devil's advocate.
Counsel must extricate himself or herself from the client's shoes and fully
assume the adversary's position. In order to properly discharge the duty of
marshaling the evidence, the challenger must present, in comprehensive and
fastidious order, every scrap of competent evidence introduced at trial
which supports the very findings the appellant resists. After constructing
this magnificent array of supporting evidence, the challenger must ferret out
a fatal flaw in the evidence. The gravity of this flaw must be sufficient to
convince the appellate court that the [trial] court's finding resting upon the
evidence is clearly erroneous.
Harris v. IESAssocs. Inc., 2003 UT App. 112, H 39.
Instead of doing this, Hillside merely lists a few references to evidence for and
against its position. This is not what the marshalling doctrine requires. Id.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
During the course of the proceeding below, Hillside moved for summary
judgment. The trial court denied summary judgment, as precluded by a genuine issue of a
material fact. On appeal, Hillside raises, for the first time, an argument that the lower
court should have granted its motion based on Rule 4-501 of the Utah Rules of Judicial
Administration. This argument should not be considered for the first time here; however,
if considered, the argument should fail because Rite Aid directly denied Hillside's
"undisputed facts", creating a genuine factual dispute.
Rite Aid effectively exercised its Option by sending Notice of Renewal to the
correct address. The trial court found, as a matter of law, that Hillside's September 2,
1996 change of address letter is unambiguous. The trial court further found, as a matter of
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fact, that the letter limits the change of address notice to rent payments. The text of the
letter states: "Please mail your future rent payments as follows: . . ." Rite Aid correctly
interpreted this letter as applying only to rent payments and rent-related correspondence.
Consequently, Rite Aid effectively exercised its Option by sending its Notice of Lease
Renewal to the address it had on file for legal notices, rather than the address provided
for rent payments. Based on its own text, the September 2, 1996 letter is unambiguous.
As a result, this Court should conclude that Rite Aid strictly complied with the Lease.
If this Court determines that the September 2, 1996 letter is ambiguous, despite the
clear language limiting its application to "rent payments", then the Court must determine
whether the trial court committed clear error in finding that Rite Aid effectively exercised
its Option. Because Hillside failed to comprehensively marshal the evidence on this issue,
Hillside's challenge should fail. However, if the Court decides to address this issue, Rite
Aid has provided relevant evidence.
The evidence presented at trial, including documents and expert testimony, shows
that Rite Aid reasonably interpreted Hillside's change of address notices as requiring the
notice of renewal to be sent to CPMC. Specifically, the September 2, 1996 letter applied
only to rent and rent-related correspondence. The letter from Hillside to Rite Aid's
maintenance personnel was not effective notice to Rite Aid's legal counsel. And the
correspondence included in Exhibit 55 was either excluded at trial for lack of
authentication or unpersuasive as limited to rent or rent-related issues (e.g., tax notices).
Consequently, even upon a finding of ambiguity, the evidence shows that Rite Aid
strictly complied with the Lease requirements in exercising its Option to renew.
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In addition to its finding of strict compliance, the trial court made an alternative
conclusion: To the extent Rite Aid was mistaken in its interpretation of Exhibit 3, such

i

mistake is equitably excused. Utah Courts have excused failure to strictly comply with
lease terms when a party has made an honest and justifiable mistake. Rite Aid's conduct
1
is analogous to the excusable conduct described in such opinions. Furthermore, where a
party's interpretation is the same as the interpretation of a trial court, such a mistake must
surely be reasonable and available for equitable excuse.
Finally, Hillside challenges the attorney fee award. By refusing to recognize Rite
Aid's notice of renewal, attempting to evict Rite Aid, and forcing Rite Aid to post a bond,
Hillside breached the Lease. According to the terms of the Lease, as interpreted by this
Court, Hillside, as the breaching party, is liable to Rite Aid for attorney fees. Hillside's
arguments for an award reduction are unsupported by evidence or legal authority, and
should consequently have no impact here. The trial court's award of attorney fees is both
correct and reasonable.

<
ARGUMENT

I.

HILLSIDE WAS NOT, AND IS NOT, ENTITLED TO SUMMARY
JUDGMENT

Hillside contends at page 33 of Brief of Appellant that its summary judgment
motion "contained a statement of undisputed facts dispositive to Hillside's case." An
examination of the record shows that, to the contrary, Hillside's facts were dispositive of
nothing. As a preliminary matter, however, this Court need not reach any of Hillside's
arguments because they failed to raise them before the trial court.
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A.

Hillside Never Raised the Rule 4-501 Issue before the Trial Court

Hillside never filed a pleading with the trial court, or otherwise argued, that the
trial court was compelled to grant Hillside summary judgment according to Utah Rule of
Judicial Administration 4-501. After Hillside filed its Notice to Submit (R. 474), it did
not file a later pleading arguing to the trial court that Rule 4-501 required it to grant
Hillside's summary judgment motion.
To adequately preserve an issue for appeal, an appellant must have afforded the
trial court the opportunity to rule on the issue. See, e.g., Katz v. Pierce, 732 P.2d 92, 95
(Utah 1986). A trial court has the opportunity to rule only if the appellant has satisfied
the following three requirements: (1) the issue must be raised in a timely fashion; (2) the
issue must be specifically raised; and (3) a party must introduce supporting evidence or
relevant legal authority. The purpose of such requirements is to put the judge on notice
of the asserted error and allow the opportunity for correction at that time in the course of
the proceeding. See Badger v. Brooklyn Canal Co., 966 P.2d 844, 847 (Utah 1998).
In other words, Hillside's failure to raise this issue to a "level of consciousness"
before the lower court precludes Hillside from raising the issue now. See, e.g., Groberg
v. Housing Opportunities, Inc., 2003 UT App 67, H 19, 68 P.3d 1015.
Even if this Court decides to reach this issue notwithstanding Hillside's failure to
bring its Rule 4-501 argument to the trial court's attention, Hillside's argument fails on
its merits.
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B.

This Court Should View the Facts in a Light Most Likely to Create
Factual Questions

When reviewing a grant of summary judgment, the appellate court applies the
same standard that the trial court applied. See, e.g., Smith v. Four Corners Mental Health
Center, Inc., 2003 UT 23, ]f 13, 70 P.3d 904 (Utah May 13, 2003). Accordingly,

i

"summary judgment is only appropriate where 'there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact . . .'" Id. In making that determination, courts "indulge all inferences and
presumptions in favor of allowing the dispute to proceed to trial and consequently view
the facts in the light most likely to create factual questions . . ." Estate Landscaping, 844
P.2d at 324 n.l (emphasis added).1 Similarly, courts should "view the facts and all
reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving
party." Smith, 2003 UT 23, If 2.
C.

,

A Party Seeking Summary Judgment Has the Burden of Establishing
All "Facts" By Competent Evidence; Until the Movant Does So, the
Non-Moving Party Has No Duty to Respond

Any party seeking summary judgment has the burden of showing that it is entitled
to summary judgment. See, e.g., Estate Landscaping, 844 P.2d at 324. To sustain its
burden, Hillside needed to "clearly establish" its right to summary judgment. See, e.g.,

1

Hillside cites Petersen v. Bd. of Educ. Of Davis County School Dist., 855 P.2d 241
(Utah 1993) for the proposition that appellate courts review trial court summary judgment
decisions "for correctness without deference to the trial court's ruling." Petersen,
however, had nothing to do with summary judgment. It reviewed a trial court's denial of
a motion to dismiss, not a summary judgment motion. See id. at 242. By definition, no
facts are in dispute in such a motion because the court accepts all averments as true. See,
e.g., Kuhre v. Goodfellow, 2003 UT App 85, % 7, 69 P.3d 286.
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Smith 2003 UT 23, ^f 24. The Utah Supreme Court recently explained the operation of
Hillside's and Rite Aid's respective burdens:
Once the moving party has presented sufficient evidence to support the
claim for judgment as a matter of law, the burden shifts to the non-moving
party to provide evidence creating an issue of material fact. . . . Therefore,
when the moving party has presented evidence sufficient to support a
judgment in its favor, and the opposing party fails to submit contrary
evidence, a trial court is justified in concluding that no genuine issue of fact
is present or would be at trial.
Id., ^f 40 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
Indeed, at page 35 of its Brief of Appellant, Hillside itself concedes that Utah Rule
of Judicial Administration 4-501 permits trial courts to grant summary judgment only if
presented with "properly supported" facts.
D.

Hillside Did Not Prove the Absence of Factual Issues Regarding the
January 21,1997 Letter on Which It So Heavily Relies

On appeal, Hillside affords considerable weight to one single page in the middle of
79 undifferentiated pages (R. 187-265) attached to John Johnson's February 6, 2001
Affidavit (the "Johnson Affidavit") (R. 184-86). That single page (R. 218) is a purported
January 21, 1997 letter from Annette Johnson to Thrifty Payless (the "Annette Johnson
Letter"). Hillside argues at page 35 of its initial brief that, pursuant to Rule 4-501,
Hillside's statement that it "sent" all 79 attached pages to Rite Aid is admitted as
undisputed fact for the purpose of summary judgment. Hillside's reading of Rule 4-501
is incorrect.
Rule 4-501 states, in pertinent part: "All material facts set forth in the movant's
statement and properly supported by an accurate reference to the record shall be deemed
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admitted for the purpose of summary judgment unless specifically controverted by the
opposing party's statement (emphasis added)".

Hillside makes two errors in its

<

application of the rule to the facts at hand: (1) Hillside failed to properly support the
assertion that it sent the letter; and (2) Rite Aid specifically controverted receipt of the
i

letter.
1.

Hillside Did Not "Properly Support" Its Naked Assertion That It
"Sent" the Annette Johnson Letter to Rite Aid

Hillside submitted, as Undisputed Fact Number 4, that "Hillside sent Rite Aid . . .
seven separate written notices of property management's new and substituted address",
including the Annette Johnson Letter (R. 361, ^f 4) (emphasis added). Although Hillside

*

submitted copies of miscellaneous documents from its files, it did not "properly support"
the statement that it "sent" the documents to Rite Aid with any competent evidence.
Instead, Hillside merely cited the Johnson Affidavit to which the Annette Johnson Letter
was attached - an affidavit which did not reference the Annette Johnson Letter, or in any
way show that Hillside Management ever sent the Annette Johnson Letter to Rite Aid.
In Litster v. Utah Valley Community College, 881 P.2d 933 (Utah Ct. App. 1994),
this Court explained the proof necessary to establish mailing:
[Litster] provides no direct evidence that the notice of claim allegedly
mailed to the attorney general was ever prepared. [Litster's attorney] does
not state that he dictated a letter addressed to the attorney, general, signed
it, or gave it to his secretary. Nor do we have an affidavit from [Litster's
lawyer's] secretary that she typed a notice addressed to the attorney
general. We do not even have direct evidence that [Litster's attorney's]
secretary photocopied the letter addressed to [defendant] or placed it in an
envelope addressed to the attorney general.
Id. at 941.
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This case is indistinguishable from Litster. Annette Johnson, the purported author
and signer of the January 21, 1997 letter, never testified - in connection with the
summary judgment, or at trial - that she prepared or signed the letter. There is no
evidence that either Ms. Johnson or her secretary typed the letter. There is no evidence
than Ms. Johnson or her secretary photocopied the letter or placed it in an envelope
addressed to Thrifty Payless at the location shown on the letter.
Moreover, Hillside downplayed the Annette Johnson letter in its summary
judgment papers. Rite Aid ignored the letter into oblivion by placing it among 79
undifferentiated pages in the Exhibit B attachment to the Johnson Affidavit, stating
merely: "Attachment hereto as Exhibit B is a true and correct summary of the
correspondence between Rite Aid and Hillside from September 1996 to May 2000." (R.
185, f 4).2 In contrast, the September 6, 1996 letter was the entirety of Exhibit "A" to the

2

Hillside also made only a cursory reference (R. 1078, p. 189:5-9) to the Annette Johnson Letter
at trial. Hillside did not think enough of the letter even to give it its own exhibit number. When
questioned by Hillside's own counsel, John Johnson said only that the copy of the Annette
Johnson Letter "came out of our files" (R. 1078, p. 213:25). After the parties rested, the trial
court expressed its puzzlement regarding Hillside's failure to present evidence that it prepared or
mailed the Annette Johnson Letter: "No legitimate reason has [been] offered why Annette
Johnson is not here to tell us why she wrote this letter, to tell us that she, in fact, did write it, that
she in fact either recalls it being sent or it would have been sent because of the normal business
practices. Mr. Johnson can't tell us that. The only [sic] he could tell us is he found it in the file.
That does not create a presumption of mailing. The courts are clear on this. There has to be
some direct evidence of either a course of conduct, a business practice or someone saying yes, I
sent it. Then there's a presumption that it's received. But Hillside hasn't done that in this case
and I thought maybe I ought to do something like order this case reopened or call as my own
witness Ms. Johnson. But then I thought, you know, quit screwing around with this case, you're
not the lawyer, decide the case on what you've got." (R. 1079 at 282:21-283:11)
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Affidavit (R. 186-87). Furthermore, Hillside did not even refer to the letter in the order
it prepared for the court denying Rite Aid's summary judgment motion.4 (R. 471-73).

<

In summary, Hillside failed to carry its burden of "properly supporting" its naked
assertion that Hillside "sent" the seventy-nine pages of which the Annette Johnson letter
was only one.
2.

Rite Aid "Specifically Controverted" Hillside's Claim That It Sent the
Annette Johnson Letter

Second, Rite Aid "specifically controverted" Hillside's assertion that it sent the
Annette Johnson Letter by providing evidence that it was not in Rite Aid's lease file.
In its argument, Hillside relies on Undisputed Fact Number 4 offered in the
memorandum opposing Rite Aid's summary judgment motion and supporting Hillside's
own summary judgment motion (R. 355-434). Rite Aid responded to this "undisputed

,

fact" in the reply memorandum supporting its own motion (R. 438-468) with one word:
"Deny" (R. 441).
i

Then, after unequivocally denying the very fact Hillside now claims Rite Aid
never denied, Rite Aid went on to explain its denial: "The January 27, 1997 letter to Lu
1

3

The divider page captioned "Exhibit 'A'" and the first page of the September 2, 1996 letter are
not paginated in the record.
4

In numbered paragraph one of that order, Hillside's counsel made clear that it did not
rely on the Annette Johnson Letter to resist Rite Aid's summary judgment motion: "The
Court finds that Rite Aid's (and its predecessor's) conduct during the four-year period
after receipt of the September 2, 1996 letter [Ex. 3] raises genuine issues as to material
facts, precluding summary judgment in favor of Rite Aid" (R. 471).
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Strong [the Annette Johnson Letter] is not in Rite Aid's lease file. See Gelman
Deposition at 42-43." (R. 441).
Viewing the evidence in a light most likely to create factual questions, this Court
should find that (1) Hillside failed to properly support the statement that it sent the
Annette Johnson Letter to Rite Aid, and (2) Rite Aid specifically controverted the
statement. Because, Hillside failed to meet the burden imposed by Rule 4-501, it would
have been error for the trial court to grant Hillside's summary judgment motion.
H.

RITE AID PROPERLY INTERPRETED HILLSIDE'S SEPTEMBER
2,1996 LETTER (EXHIBIT 3) AS CHANGING THE ADDRESS
ONLY FOR RENT AND RENT-RELATED CORRESPONDENCE;
RITE AID TIMELY SENT ITS RENEWAL NOTICE TO THE
CORRECT ADDRESS

In its Statement Regarding the Issues, supra at 1, Rite Aid showed that the
standard of review of this second issue is correctness if the relevant writings are
unambiguous, or clearly erroneous if the Court should find it must examine "facts
deduced from testimony". Provo River Water Users Assoc, v. Morgan, 857 P.2d at 931.
An ambiguity exists where language "is reasonably capable of being understood in
more than one sense." R&R Energies v. Mother Earth Indus., Inc., 936 P.2d 1068, 1074
(Utah 1997). Whether a document or writing is ambiguous is a question of law. See,
e.g., Faulkner v. Farnsworth, 665 P.2d 1292, 1293 (Utah 1983); Sprouse v. Jager, 806
P.2d 219-220-221 (Utah Ct. App. 1991).
A.

The Trial Court Found Exhibit 3 to Be Unambiguous

The trial court entered the following conclusions on this issue:
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6.
The effectiveness of Exhibit 5 to exercise Rite Aid's Option to
renew the Lease therefore rises or falls with Exhibit 3.
<

13.
Exhibit 3 is not ambiguous. It says send rent payments to the new
address. Rite Aid did that.
R. 977,979.
Thus, the first issue this Court must address is the correctness of (1) the trial
court's conclusion that Exhibit 3 is unambiguous, and (2) its reading of Exhibit 3. This
requires an examination of Exhibits 2 and 3, included herein as Addenda B and C.
1.

\

Exhibit 2 Sets the State for Exhibit 3 by Providing a Change of
Address for All Mail

On March 19, 1992 Commerce Properties Management Corporation ("CPMC"),

(

Hillside's property manager at the time, sent a form letter to Rite Aid's predecessor in
interest. (Ex. 2, R. 978 % 11, 1077 at 39) That March 19, 1992 letter gave Rite Aid's
predecessor the following notice:
Many of you have continued to deliver rental payments and other mail
our former address. Effective March 20, 1992 our brokerage company
moving from their location at 275 East S. Temple to their new offices.
the future all rental payments and mail for [CPMC] should be addressed
follows:

to
is
In
as

i

Hillside Plaza Limited
Commerce Properties Management Corp.
5282 South 320 West, Suite D-100
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107

i

Ex. 2 (emphasis added).
•

There is no dispute that Rite Aid's predecessor received Exhibit 2 and that it put
Exhibit 2 in the permanent Lease file.
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2.

Hillside Management Sends Exhibit 3, Providing a Change of Address
for Rent Payments Only

On September 2, 1996 Hillside Management sent a form letter (Ex. 3, R. 978-79 f
12) to Rite Aid's predecessor. Exhibit 3 provided the following notice:
For the month of September, 1996, [CPMC] will forward your rental payment to
Hillside Management. Please mail your future rent payments as follows:
Hillside Plaza Shopping Center
c/o Hillside Management
P.O. Box 900511
Sandy, Utah 84090
Your rental payments should be made in accordance with the terms of your lease
and must be received no later than the date specified in your lease.
Ex. 3 (emphasis added).
The trial court explained the difference between the two letters: "Unlike Exhibit 2,
Exhibit 3 gave no change of address instructions for "mail" or "other mail". It expressly
limited the address change to "rent" and "rental" payments." (Finding 14, R. 979, | 14)
(emphasis added).
3.

The Dispute before This Court Is Whether Rite Aid Sent its Notice of
Renewal to the Correct Address

The Lease (Ex. 51), included herein as Addendum D, provides, at ^J (1):
The preliminary term of this Lease shall commence with the date of this
Lease [May 6, 1974] and extend until the date of the commencement of the
original term as defined in the article of the Lease Agreement entitled
"COMMENCEMENT OF ORIGINAL TERM." The original term of this
Lease [the "Original Term"] shall commence upon the expiration of said
preliminary term and shall expire at midnight on January 31 following the
expiration of twenty-five (25) years from the commencement of original
term.
(R. 9 8 0 4 19).
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The Original Term of the Lease commenced on October 6, 1975. Accordingly the
Original Term ended at midnight, January 31, 2001. (Ex. 51).

<

The Lease further provides, at ]f (2):
OPTION TO EXTEND [the "Option"]: Tenant, at its option may extend
the term of this Lease for not to exceed four separate and additional
consecutive periods of 5 years each. Each such extension shall be exercised
by giving written notice to Landlord at least 180 days prior to the expiration
of the original term hereof or any such extended term. Upon such exercise,
this Lease and the Lease Agreement shall be deemed to be extended
without the execution or any further lease of other instrument.

*

(Ex.51).
Consequently, Rite Aid had to give Landlord written notice of Rite Aid's exercise
of the Option, and renewal not later than August 4, 2000, the date 180 days before
January 31, 2002.
Accordingly, on June 21, 2000, Rite Aid sent, via certified mail, return receipt

{

requested, its notice of renewal of the Lease to the most recent address it had for general
mail to its landlord, and the same address it had used for its March 21, 1997 letter:
Hillside, c/o CPMG, 5282 South 320 West, Suite D, Salt Lake City, UT 84107 (Ex. 5,
Finding 20, R. 980 f 20, 1077 at 45-46). The Domestic Return Receipt from the United
i

States Postal Service for the June 21, 2000 letter (Ex. 5) shows that CPMG received the
letter on June 29, 2000 (Finding 21, R. 980 ^f 21). There was no dispute on this point at
trial.

i
The only question at issue is this: Did Rite Aid send its notice of renewal to the

correct address? Comparing and contrasting Exhibits 2 and 3, the trial court concluded
that because Exhibit 3 referred to the mailing of rent only, it left intact the Exhibit 2
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address for "mail" and "other mail". As a result the trial court further concluded that Rite
Aid timely sent its renewal notice to the correct address, and that it consequently had
effectively exercised its Option.
Hillside's Issues 2 and 3 both ask the Court to decide if the trial court correctly
found and concluded that Rite Aid effectively exercised its renewal Option. If this Court
reads Exhibits 2 and 3 in the same way the trial court did, that ends its examination of
Hillside's Issues 2 and 3, and the only issue remaining for the Court's attention is
Hillside's fourth issue, involving attorney fees.
If, on the other hand, this Court concludes that Exhibit 3 is ambiguous, it then
needs to address whether the trial court was clearly erroneous in finding, based on trial
evidence, that Rite Aid had effectively exercised its Option.
Rite Aid now addresses that evidence.
B.

Analysis of the Evidence

As relevant to this issue, the trial court made the following findings:
Rite Aid Strictly Complied With Option Exercise Requirements
28. In writing Exhibit 3, Hillside Management intended to change the
mailing address for all purposes from [CPMC] to Hillside Management;
Exhibit 3, however, does not express that intention (R. 981).
29. Rite Aid was unaware of this intention until after August 4, 2000,
the deadline for Rite Aid's Option exercise (R. 981-82).
30. Because it changed the address for legal notice only on its PIMS
system, leaving the address for other correspondence unchanged, it is clear
that Rite Aid's predecessor-in-interest read Exhibit 3 as changing the
address for rent and rent-related activities only, leaving unaffected the
address contained in Exhibit 2 for correspondence not involving rent and
rent-related activities (R. 982).
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31.
It is not uncommon in the commercial leasing industry for landlords
and tenants to establish multiple addresses for various types of
correspondence (R. 982).

*

32.
The phrase "property management" does not have any standard or
generally recognized meaning in the commercial leasing industry (R. 982).
33.
The phrase "property management" may or may not mean "all"
activities involving the managed property (R. 982).
34.
Under the evidence admitted at trial, it is of really small moment
whether Rite Aid read Exhibit 3 or not prior to sending Exhibit 5, because
Exhibit 3 makes reference only to the address for "rent", and not to other
types of correspondence, and therefore changed the address for rent only
(R. 982).
35.
Rite Aid's interpretation of Exhibit 3 as affecting only the address
for rent and rent-related correspondence was reasonable (R. 982).

<

i

(

36.
Hillside presented no evidence establishing that Rite Aid should be
charged with knowledge of its or Hillside Management's unexpressed
intent (R. 983).
37.
It would not have been difficult for Hillside Management to have
written a letter that clearly and unequivocally changed the address for all
types of notice; indeed its purported January 21, 1997 letter accomplished
that purpose (R. 983).
i

38.
The Court is not impressed with Hillside's arguments that it
repeatedly sent correspondence to Rite Aid containing the Sandy post office
box address because such correspondence was rent-related, and in many
cases merely requested that Rite Aid remit monies to the listed address (R.
983).
39.
To the extent Hillside wanted Rite Aid to correct the address it was
using, Hillside provided no explanation of its failure ever to send any
change of address notice to Rite Aid at the address it had specified in
Exhibit 4 as applying to legal notices (Attention: Secretary, Post Office Box
3165, Harrisburg, Pennsylvania) (R. 983).

i

I

As Rite Aid showed in its Statement of the Issues, the Court addresses this issue
under a clearly erroneous standard of review. See, e.g., Sprouse v. Jager, 806 P.2d at
221. In the process of its review, this Court "resolve[s] any ambiguities in the evidence
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in favor of the trial court's judgment." Provo River Water Users Assoc, v. Morgan, 857
P.2dat931.
Before starting to challenge these twelve findings, Utah law requires Hillside to
marshal all evidence supporting each of them "in comprehensive and fastidious order".
Harris v. IES Assocs. Inc., 2003 UT App. 112, \ 39.
Hillside's purported marshalling is neither comprehensive nor fastidious. To the
contrary, Hillside makes a half-hearted attempt at summarizing selected testimony, and
then proceeds to reargue its case. Although the Court should simply reject Hillside's
challenge as failing the marshaling requirement, Rite Aid shows some of the deficiencies
in Hillside's argument, below.
In its unsatisfactory effort to "ferret out a fatal flaw in the evidence," Brief of
Appellant at 21 (quoting Eggett v. Wasatch Energy Corp., 2001 UT App 226, % 42, 29
P.3d 668, 676)., Hillside argues that Rite Aid's evidence was either inadmissible or failed
to support the lower court's findings and that Hillside's evidence received insufficient
consideration. Hillside is wrong. The facts and the law make clear that (1) Robert
Baker's testimony is admissible as to questions of fact, (2) Hillside's attempt to impeach
Baker has no effect on the court's findings, (3) Hillside's letter to Rite Aid's maintenance
personnel is ineffective as notice for change of address, and (4) Hillside failed to show
that anything in Exhibit 55 effectively changed the address for legal notices.
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The Trial Court Properly Admitted Baker's Testimony to Address
Factual Questions regarding Common Practices in the Commercial
Leasing Industry

Hillside argues that Baker's testimony is inadmissible because he draws legal
conclusions. As implied above, a trial court may properly admit expert testimony to
resolve questions of fact in contract disputes. See Sprouse v. Jager at 221. Expert
witnesses may explain trade usage or custom, clarify ambiguous or technical terms, and
generally elucidate the parties' intentions. See Craig Food Indus, v. Weihing, 746 P.2d
279, 283 (Utah 1987). As demonstrated in two examples cited in the Brief of Appellant,
Mr. Baker's testimony served these purposes.
First, Baker testified that the phrase "property management" had no generally
recognized meaning in the commercial leasing industry. See Brief of Appellant 22, \ 8,
& 23, H 2; R. 1078 at 140. The court properly admitted Baker's testimony to help the
court answer questions of fact regarding the meaning of the phrase. (Finding 32, R. 982, f
32)
Second, Baker submitted to a series of questions at trial regarding whether certain
actions would be "reasonable" (R. 1078 at 142). Hillside objected, claiming that the
questions "call[ed] for the ultimate legal conclusion in this case." Id. The trial judge
overruled Hillside's objections.5 Id. The exchange addressed reasonable custom and
conduct in the commercial leasing industry, and was, therefore, admissible as to
questions of fact.

5

The trial judge assured that parties that he would disregard any legal conclusions to
which Baker might testify. Id.
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2.

Hillside's Alleged Impeachment of Baker's Testimony Does Not Alter
the Court's Findings of Fact or Have Any Impact on the Outcome of
the Case

Hillside claims to have "fully impeached" Baker and asks this Court to disregard
his testimony on such basis. See Brief of Appellant at 24-25. Appellate courts recognize
"the trial court's position of advantage to observe witnesses' demeanor and other factors
bearing on credibility." State v. Ashe, 745 P.2d 1255, 1258 (Utah 1987). However, even
the transcripts reveal that the trial court was not clearly erroneous in making findings of
fact consistent with the witness evidence. There are at least two explanations: (1) the trial
court found Baker's testimony to be credible; or (2) the trial court disregarded the
disputed portion of Baker's testimony and based its findings on other evidence.
Hillside expresses concern with that portion of Baker's testimony discussing the
September 2 form letter from Hillside (Exhibit 2). See Brief of Appellant at 24-25. When
cross-examined by Hillside, Baker answered affirmatively that "it might be a typical
practice . . . to look through the lease file prior to sending a [lease] renewal notice and
look for a notice letter" (R. 1078 at 145). Then, Mr. Baker testified that the September 2
letter was a "change of address letter" (R. 1078 at 146).
Hillside's counsel carefully avoided asking the logical next question: "Change of
address for what?" Counsel for Rite Aid did ask that question:
COUNSEL FOR RITE AID: First, with [respect] to questions you were
asked about page 43 of your deposition, does Exhibit 3, to your mind, serve
as a notice of change of address for something?
BAKER: Yes.
COUNSEL FOR RITE AID: What is that something?
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BAKER: Rent.
COUNSEL FOR RITE AID: Anything Else?
BAKER:No.
(R. 1078 at 154-55). Thus Hillside manufactured the inconsistency it claims at pages 2425 of its Brief of Appellant.
In any event, the trial court may have disregarded Baker's testimony on the issue
of Exhibit 3, but found his testimony credible as to other factual issues. Hillside cites no
rule requiring a fact finder to disregard a witness's entire testimony based on a single
perceived inconsistency. The record contains ample evidence consistent with the court's
various findings regarding Exhibit 3.
For example, the following exchange occurred between Right Aid's counsel and
Johnson, Hillside's witness:
COUNSEL FOR RITE AID: You don't say anywhere in Exhibit 3 that the
address for mail or correspondence or notice for Hillside Plaza, Ltd. is in
care of Hillside Management, do you?
JOHNSON: I do not say notice in that document, that is correct? [sic]
COUNSEL FOR RITE AID: And you don't say mail and you don't say
correspondence either, do you?
JOHNSON: That is correct.
COUNSEL FOR RITE AID: Mr. Johnson, you have never to this day on
behalf of Hillside Management of [sic] Hillside Plaza Ltd. sent a letter to
Rite Aid Corporation, attention Secretary, P.O. Box 3165, Harrisburg,
Pennsylvania, by certified mail or not, for that matter, telling Rite Aid to
send notices or mail to Hillside Plaza in care of Hillside Management at the
Sandy post office box, have you?
JOHNSON: No, I have not.
(R. 1078 at 109:25-110:15).
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Hillside did not marshal that evidence.
The trial court could also have based that finding on testimony of I. Lawrence
Gelman, the Secretary and Vice President of Thrifty Payless ("Gelman") (R. 1077 at 25):
COUNSEL FOR RITE AID: Mr. Gelman, doesn't Exhibit 3 say that the
property management company had changed?
GELMAN: It says property manager's responsibilities have been assumed
by Hillside management.
COUNSEL FOR RITE AID: With respect to that statement, why didn't you
send Exhibit 5, the Notice of Renewal, to Hillside Plaza, Ltd., the landlord
in the case of Hillside Management?
GELMAN: Well, the letter is very specific as to what responsibilities
they're undertaking. Primarily it talks about rent and there are at least 1, 2,
3 references to rent and so, in my view, this is a notice of a new property
manager and that they're assuming responsibility to accept rent on behalf of
the landlord. They may be doing other things, but what it doesn't say and
sometimes it's more what something doesn't say that tells you what you're
looking at, is it doesn't say anything about sending notice of any sort to this
landlord pursuant to the terms of the lease, this manager, property manager
COUNSEL FOR RITE AID: Thank you. Does Exhibit 3 say anything
about sending mail in general?
GELMAN: No, it doesn't say anything about mail. It doesn't say anything
about correspondence. It doesn't say anything about notice. It's really
quite naked in that regard.
(R. 1077 at 47:10-48:6).
Hillside did not marshal that evidence, either.
In its findings of fact, the trial court stated that the September 2 letter "expressly
limited the address change to 'rent' and 'rental payments.'" (Finding 14, R. 979 f 14) No
matter what deficiencies may or may not exist in Baker's testimony, the unchallenged
and unmarshaled Johnson and Gelman testimony supports Finding 14.
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Rite Aid could fill the better part of its brief with other evidence supporting the
trial court's findings on this issue. It is not, however, Rite Aid's duty to do so. Out of an
abundance of caution, however, Rite Aid briefly discusses below the singular role of
exchanges between Hillside and Bernard Reth, a Rite Aid employee ("Reth").
3.

Hillside's Correspondence with Reth Did Not Effectively Change the
Address to which Rite Aid Should Send Legal Notices

Hillside makes repeated references to Reth in its Brief of Appellant. Basically,
Hillside argues that a July 22, 1999 letter that Hillside wrote to Reth about the painting of
a curb (Trial Exhibit 7; R. 1077 at 52) gave Rite Aid legally sufficient notice of Hillside's
correct address for legal notice. There are three independent reasons why Exhibit 7 did
not give Rite Aid notice that Hillside had purportedly changed its address for legal
notices.
First, Hillside sent the letter to Reth at P.O. Box 1169, Camp Hill, Pennsylvania.
In a March 21, 1997 letter (Exhibit 4), however, Rite Aid told Hillside that all future legal
notices (such as the change of address for legal notice) must be sent: "Attention:
Secretary, P.O. Box 3165, Harrisburg, Pennsylvania".

Reth was neither Rite Aid's

corporate Secretary, nor did he receive his mail at the same address as Rite Aid's legal
department (1 Tr. 52). Reth has nothing to do with Rite Aid's legal department (R. 1077
at 52). He was a landlord liaison in Rite Aid's maintenance group (R. 1077 at 51), and
received his mail through a post office box in an entirely different city (Camp Hill) than
the one Rite Aid had designated for service of legal notices (Harrisburg). See Exhibit 7.
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Second, Reth had no authority to act for Rite Aid with respect to receiving legal
notices. In his capacity as a landlord liaison, he dealt with maintenance items for some of
Rite Aid's 3500 (R. 1077 at 28) stores (R. 1077 at 51). That is the reason Reth was the
author of the initial July 8, 1999 letter to Hillside concerning painting the curb red. (Ex.
55, fourth page)
Third, ignoring the obvious limitations on Reth's authority - and once again
ignoring its duty to marshal evidence supporting the trial court's findings - Hillside
obliquely argues at pages 31-33 of its Brief of Appellant, that a letter to Reth - one of
80,000 Rite Aid employees (R. 1077 at 54:11) - provided legally sufficient notice under
the Lease to Rite Aid's corporate Secretary. This is not the law.
It is axiomatic that an agent must act pursuant to either actual or apparent
authority. See, e.g., Zions First Nat. Bank v. Clark Clinic Corp., 762 P.2d 1090, 1094
(Utah 1988). The Zions Court described the contours of actual authority:
Actual authority incorporates the concepts of express and implied authority.
Express authority exists whenever the principal directly states that its agent
has the authority to perform a particular act on the principal's behalf.
Implied authority, on the other hand, embraces authority to do those acts
which are incidental to, or are necessary, usual, and proper to accomplish or
perform, the main authority expressly delegated to the agent.
Id. It is undisputed that Reth's authority began and ended with working with landlords
on maintenance-related issues. Therefore he did not have actual authority to receive
change-of-address notices on behalf of Rite Aid's corporate Secretary.
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The law similarly makes clear that Reth did not have apparent authority to receive
legal notices for Rite Aid's corporate Secretary. Apparent authority arises only in a

I

precisely defined way:
Nor is the authority of the agent "apparent" merely because it looks so to
the person with whom he deals. It is the principal who must cause third
parties to believe that the agent is clothed with apparent authority . . . .

*

Id. at 1095. Hillside presented no evidence that Rite Aid ever told Hillside anything
about the scope of Reth's authority. Hillside accordingly cannot successfully claim that

•'

Reth had apparent authority to receive legal notices on behalf of Rite Aid's corporate
Secretary.
Two additional decisions establish that Hillside's letter to Reth did not constitute
notice to Rite Aid's corporate Secretary. In Hardy v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 763
P.2d 761, 767 (Utah 1988) the court stated the applicable rule: "[T]he knowledge of the
agent is not imputed to the principal where the agent's duties or apparent duties have no
connection with the subject matter to which the knowledge relates."
Earlier, in Bank of Salt Lake v. The Corp. ofPres. of the Church of Jesus Christ of
Latter-Day Saintsf 534 P.2d 887, 888 (Utah 1975), the court reversed the trial court's
finding that notice to Leland Bruderer, a Church employee at its Seminaries and Institutes
Department, constituted legal notice to the Church itself of a vendor's assignment to
plaintiff bank of the right to payment for goods delivered to Bruderer's department. In
reversing the trial court the Supreme Court explained:
The subject notices never came to the attention of the Church, neither were they
delivered to the place of business . . . held out by the Church as the place for the
receipt of such communications. Due diligence did not require communication of
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such information, since such was not one of Bruderer's duties; furthermore,
Bruderer in the performance of his work did not have reason to know of the terms
of the invoices and therefore that the transaction would be materially affected by
his information concerning the assignment.
Id. at 891. Hillside's notion that notice to Reth was notice to Rite Aid's corporate
Secretary is therefore wishful thinking and nothing more. Just as with Bruderer, Reth
"did not have reason to know" that the Lease "would be materially affected by his
information concerning" a mailing address which, as far as Reth knew, applied solely to
him.
4.

Nothing in Exhibit 55 Effectively Changed Hillside's Address for Legal
Notices

For the reasons addressed in subsection D, supra at 11, the trial court found as
follows with respect to the Annette Johnson Letter:
24.
Trial Exhibit 55 contains a January 21, 1997 letter from Annette
Johnson of Hillside management to Lu Strong of Rite Aid's predecessor-ininterest (the "January 21, 1997 Letter") (R. 981).
25.
At trial, Hillside presented no competent evidence that Hillside ever
sent the January 21,1997 Letter to Rite Aid or anyone else (R. 981).
26.
Hillside offered no evidence nor excuse explaining or justifying
Annette Johnson's failure to testify at trial (R.981).
27.
The Court has great concern regarding the authenticity of the
January 21, 1997 Letter; in any event, Hillside has not met its burden of
proving that Hillside Management sent that letter. As a result the Court
will disregard it (R. 981).
Hillside does not appeal the trial court's refusal to consider the Annette Johnson
Letter at trial. Hillside does, however, make various amorphous arguments that the
remaining documents in Exhibit 55 somehow (1) provided Rite Aid with notice of
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Hillside's address for legal notices, or (2) show that Rite Aid realized that it should send
legal notices to the address contained in Exhibit 3.

<

With respect to those arguments, the trial court found:
38.
The Court is not impressed with Hillside's arguments that it
repeatedly sent correspondence to Rite Aid containing the Sandy post office
box address because such correspondence was rent-related, and in many
cases merely requested that Rite Aid remit monies to the listed address.

*

R.983.
i

An examination of Exhibit 55 shows that, with the Exception of Exhibits 3 which Hillside also included in Exhibit 55 - and the discredited Annette Johnson Letter,
everything Rite Aid sent was indeed rent or rent-related. Everything Hillside sent either

(

involved rent or rent-related issues (CAM charges, taxes), or signage. Nothing remotely
involved notice of an address change for legal notices.
Once again, Hillside failed to marshal any of that evidence. Rite Aid has briefly
done Hillside's marshaling for it in the preceding paragraphs. There is ample factual
support for Findings Nos. 28-39. To the extent there might be any ambiguities in the
evidence, this Court resolves those ambiguities in favor of the trial court's judgment.
Accordingly, this Court should affirm the trial court's findings. If the Court does so, it
need not reach Hillside's third issue on appeal - the issue of equitable mistake.
III.

EVEN IF RITE AID WERE MISTAKEN IN ITS READING OF
EXHIBIT 3, THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY FOUND THAT
MISTAKE TO BE EQUITABLY EXCUSED

As shown in the prior section of this argument, the trial court concluded that Rite
Aid strictly complied with the terms of the Lease in effectively exercising its Option. In

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

{

addition to finding that Rite Aid had strictly complied with the renewal Option under the
Lease, the trial court made alternative findings:
Mistake
47. Alternatively, Rite Aid interpreted Exhibit 3 in a manner
inconsistent with Hillside Management's intention (R. 983-84).
48.

Hillside Management prepared Exhibit 3 (R. 984).

49. The change-of-address portion of Exhibit 3 deals only with "rent" or
"rental" (R. 984).
50. Hillside Management accordingly caused any confusion inherent in
Exhibit 3 (R. 984).
51. It is not reasonable under the circumstances to charge Rite Aid with
knowledge of what was in Hillside Management's mind (R. 984).
52. To the extent that Rite Aid addressed Exhibit 5 to the wrong address,
that error was the result of an honest and justifiable mistake in interpreting
Exhibit 3 (R. 984).
53. No trial evidence showed that Rite Aid was negligent in exercising
the Option to renew the Lease (R. 984).
The trial court then concluded:
12. Alternatively, to the extent Rite Aid was mistaken in its
interpretation of Exhibit 3, that mistake is equitably excused under the
foregoing factual circumstances (R. 986).
Hillside does not challenge the trial court's findings as they apply to this issue.
Instead, it challenges the court's alternative conclusion, arguing that strict compliance is
required and equitable excuse is unavailable. See Brief of Appellant at 40. Because
Hillside does not challenge - or marshal evidence supporting - the trial court's findings
regarding mistake, this Court accepts those findings as true and proceeds to a review of
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the accuracy of the lower court's conclusions of law and the application of that law to the
undisputed facts. See Saunders v. Sharp, 806 P.2d 198, 199 (Utah 1991).

<

Accordingly, this Court's role is to determine if the trial court's unchallenged
findings support its Conclusion No. 12. The trial court correctly concluded that even if
Rite Aid were mistaken in its reading of Exhibit 3, that mistake was equitably excused.
This Court reviews the trial court's conclusion under an abuse of discretion standard. See
U.S. Realty 86, 2002 UT 14, Tf 12, Trolley Square Assocs. v. Nielson, 886 P.2d at 65-66.
In appealing that conclusion Hillside relies on Geisdorf v. Doughty, 972 P.2d at
70, to support its contention that "when [an] optionee decides to exercise his option he
must act unconditionally and precisely according to the terms of the option." Brief of
Appellant at 40. However, Hillside omits the exceptions recognized in the Geisdorf
opinion:
Indeed, there are instances in which deviation from strict compliance may
be equitably excused. . . . [One instance] in which an optionee may be
excused from strict compliance [is] when the optionee's conduct in failing
to comply was not due to willful or gross negligence on the part of the
optionee but was rather the result of an honest and justifiable mistake...
Geisdorf v. Doughty, 972 P.2d at 71.
Hillside also relies on Utah Coal and Lumber, 2001 UT 100, Tf 11, in which the
tenant failed to timely exercise a renewal option to renew a lease with its landlord. The
landlord brought an unlawful detainer action, and the tenant successfully argued to the
trial court that its failure to strictly comply with the Lease renewal provision should be
equitably excused. The landlord appealed the trial court's summary judgment in favor of
the tenant. See id. at \ 1.
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Unlike the present case, however, the tenant in Utah Coal did not timely mail its
notice of renewal. To the contrary, it mailed the notice eleven days late. See id. at ^ 5.
Relying on the foregoing language from Geisdorf, the trial court found that the tenant's
failure to renew the lease timely was the result of an "honest and justifiable mistake."
Seeid.at^l.
On appeal, the landlord argued that the tenant's failure did not arise from a
mistake at all, but was rather the result of inattention and negligence, and that "mere
negligence" does not merit application of the equitable excuse doctrine recognized in the
Geisdorf opinion. See id. atffl[8, 10.
The Utah Supreme Court found the nature of the tenant's conduct to be the critical
inquiry. The tenant simply forgot to mail the notice on time because of its own oversight,
forgetfulness and preoccupation with other matters. In the words of one of the tenant's
owners: "It wasn't for any reason other than I was busy. We were busy doing other
things in our business, wearing other hats." Id. at f 19.
In reversing the trial court's summary judgment for the tenant, the Utah Supreme
Court noted that mistake and negligence are different: "[I]n equity a mistake cannot be
based on a negligent act or omission." Id. at f 20. The Court further explained:
When one is charged with a duty, and forgets to do it, it may under certain
circumstances constitute excusable negligence, but it cannot be held to be a
mistake. . . Negligently and inadvertently omitting to perform a duty is far
different than to omit it through mistake or accident.
Id. (emphasis added).
The Utah Coal court then defined "mistake":
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A mistake within the meaning of equity is a non-negligent but erroneous
mental condition, conception or conviction induced by ignorance,
misapprehension, or misunderstanding, resulting in some act or omission
done or suffered by one or both parties, without its erroneous character
being intended or known at the time

<

Id. (quoting 27A Am.Jur.2d Equity § 7 (1996)) (emphasis added).
By way of illustration, the Utah Coal court expressly noted that excusable mistake
includes a contracting party's mistaken "understanding of the contract". Id. (emphasis
provided by the White Pine court) (citing Jensen v. Manila Corp. of Church of Jesus
Christ of Latter-day Saints, 565 P.2d 63, 64-65 (Utah 1977)).
Thus, Utah Coal states a simple legal rule regarding the effect of mistake in the
context of lease renewal: "Where a lessee's failure to exercise an option to renew a lease
in a timely manner is due to . . . mistake . . . it would be oppressive and unjust to require
strict compliance with the lease, and thus equity should be invoked." Utah Coal and
Lumber, 2001 UT 100, ^f 14. So here, it would be oppressive and unjust for this Court to
find Rite Aid failed to exercise its Option because it made a mistake in interpreting
Hillside's 1996 Letter - a letter that the trial court found Rite Aid strictly complied with.
Hillside asks the Court to hold that equitable mistake is never available to a tenant
who misinterprets a document, because the misinterpretation necessarily means that the
tenant did not strictly comply. This heads-I-win-tails-you-lose position would nullify the
holding of Utah Coal and the other cases Rite Aid discusses in this section. For Utah
Coal to have any vitality at all, it must mean, at a minimum, that if a tenant misinterprets
a lease provision in the same way as a district court judge, the tenant made a "mistake".
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Two months after entry of its Utah Coal decision, the Utah Supreme Court
decided U.S. Realty 86 Assoc. There, the tenant sent its notices of renewal more than
forty-five days late, see id. at f 7, and brought a declaratory judgment action seeking
equitable relief. See id. at Tf 1. The tenant's employees readily admitted that they did not
even read the leases until after the forty-five days had expired. See id. at f 18.
The trial court in US. Realty concluded that, as professionals, the tenant's
employees had to exercise a higher duty of care than ordinary tenants, and that their
failure to read the leases until forty-five days after the renewal deadline had passed
amounted to "wilful and gross negligence". See id. at If 12. The Utah Supreme Court
affirmed the trial court but rejected its analysis, making it clear "that courts do not need
to inquire into, nor do we need to address, the level of negligence that may contribute to a
lessee's failure to timely exercise its option. Negligence, regardless of the type, may not,
by itself, serve as grounds for equitable relief." Id. at f 13.
Citing the same American Jurisprudence passage as the Utah Coal court, the US.
Realty court confirmed that a negligent act cannot constitute a "mistake" in the legal
sense. See id. at If 17. Accordingly, because the trial court found that the tenant's
employees were negligent, and found nothing that would constitute a "mistake", the
Utah Supreme Court held that equitable relief was unwarranted. See id.
As shown above, the Utah Coal court expressly noted that the misunderstanding
of contractual provisions is mistake, not negligence. See Utah Coal and Lumber, 2001
UT 100 at \ 20. In light of the lower court's finding that the change of address portion
Exhibit 3 did not apply to legal notices, there is no factual basis for negligence. Indeed,
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in its Finding No. 46 the trial court wrote: u No trial evidence showed that Rite Aid was
negligent in exercising the Option to renew the Lease." R. at 984.
Consequently, even if this Court should conclude that Rite Aid (and the trial court)
were mistaken in their reading of Exhibit 3, the law makes clear that equity can and
should properly excuse that mistake. For all the foregoing reasons, the trial court did not
abuse its discretion in concluding that any mistake Rite Aid might have made in reading
Exhibit 3 was equitably excused.
IV.

THE TRIAL COURT'S ATTORNEY FEE AWARD TO RITE AID
WAS JUSTIFIED AND PROPER

Utah courts award attorneys' fees according to the terms of the contract. See, e.g.,
Dixie State Bank v. Bracken, 764 P.2d 985, 988 (Utah 1988). Interpretation of a contract
to determine whether attorneys' fees are recoverable is a question of law. See Zions First
Nat'l Bank, N.A. v. National Am, Title Ins. Co., 749 P.2d at 656. This Court accordingly
reviews a determination of such questions for correctness. Id.
A.

The Lease Provides that Hillside, As the Breaching Party, Is Liable to
Rite Aid for Attorneys Fees

The Lease provides: "The costs, including reasonable attorneys' fees, of any
action brought to enforce any of the terms or provisions of this Lease, shall be borne by
the party adjudged by the court to have violated any of the terms or provisions of this
Lease." (Ex. 51 at 15, section 23)
In a prior action between Hillside and Rite Aid, this Court has already determined
that this same Lease provision in this same Lease required an award of attorneys fees to
the prevailing party in an interpretive dispute. See Thrifty Payless v. Hillside Plaza Ltd,,
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2001 UT App 296 (Utah Ct. App. 2001). In that earlier case, Rite Aid and Hillside
sought resolution of a contract dispute regarding the proper interpretation of a tax offset
provision. Id. This Court found that Rite Aid had interpreted the Lease Agreement
correctly, that it had not waived its right to offsets, and that it still had a right to assert its
offsets. Id. at 2.
Even though all Hillside had done in that action was contest Rite Aid's
interpretation of the Lease, this court concluded that Hillside had breached the Lease by
contesting Rite Aid's efforts to exercise its offset rights. Consequently, "Rite Aid was
entitled to attorney fees and costs," including its costs on appeal. Id.
In the present action, Hillside violated section 2 of the Lease by failing to honor
Rite Aid's Option to Extend (R. 971-72). The trial court found that Rite Aid strictly
complied with the terms of the Lease in exercising its Option (R. 986, ]f 10). However,
even after Hillside received actual notice of Rite Aid's claim that it had effectively
exercised the Option, Hillside nevertheless declared the Option expired, took steps to
evict Rite Aid, and forced Rite Aid to post a bond to prevent its eviction (R. 435-37,
971). The trial court found that Hillside's conduct constituted a violation of the Lease (R.
971-72).
In the earlier action, this Court found that Hillside's misinterpretation of the Lease
and denial of a lease right was a breach of the Lease entitling Rite Aid to an award of its
attorney fees and costs pursuant to the Lease. In the present action, Hillside breached its
Lease obligation by failing to afford Rite Aid its Option renewal rights. That breach
entitles Rite Aid to attorneys' fees and costs.
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B.

The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Awarding Attorney
Fees in a Reasonable Amount

The trial court is in the best position "to gauge the quality and efficiency of the
representation and the complexity of the litigation." Richard Barton Enters, v. Tsern, 928
P.2d 368, 380 (Utah 1996). Therefore, the amount of an attorney fee award "will not be
reversed unless the court abuses its discretion." Id.
The Utah Supreme Court developed the following practical guidelines for a trial
court to use in determining a reasonable fee award:
1.

What legal work was actually performed?

2.
How much of the work performed was reasonably necessary to
adequately prosecute the matter?
3.
Is the attorney's billing rate consistent with the rates customarily
charged in the locality for similar services?
4.
Are there circumstances which require consideration of additional
factors, including those listed in the Code of Professional Responsibility?
Dixie State Bank v. Bracken, 764 P.2d 985, 990 (Utah 1988).
In its June 17, 2002 Minute Entry, the trial court ruled: "The Court takes the
Affidavits filed by Mr. Wycoff and Ms. Meyer as establishing prima facie entitlement to
the fees requested. The burden will then be upon counsel for Hillside to demonstrate
inappropriateness of the bills through cross-examination or other testimony at such an
evidentiary hearing. A notice of said hearing is enclosed (emphasis added)."
Next, Hillside's counsel filed an August 21, 2002 Affidavit enumerating the fees
and costs they had billed Hillside for representation in this matter (R. 1002-04). On
September 26, 2002, the trial court entered its Incourt Note: "Based upon stipulation of
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counsel, per phone messages, the hearing set for today is vacated, and counsel will
submit written memos. No further hearing will be necessary on these issues." (R. 1005).
On September 30, 2002, counsel for Hillside filed a Stipulation Concerning
Attorney Fees, wherein they stated:
Hillside is agreeable to submitting written objections regarding the
reasonableness of Rite Aid's attorney fees, and to Rite Aid's filing a
response thereto. Hillside withdraws its earlier request for a hearing and
requests the Court to rule on this stipulation of facts and on the written
submissions of law and argument.
(R. 1007).
Hillside further stipulated that (1) Rite Aid's counsel worked the hours and
incurred the costs they billed Rite Aid, and (2) the billing rates of Rite Aid's counsel
were reasonable within the Salt Lake City Community (R. 1007-08).
On October 1, 2002 Hillside filed its Memorandum Opposing Award of Attorney
Fees to Rite Aid (R. 1011-16). In that memorandum, Hillside presented no evidence of
any description except to assert that Rite Aid's total fees were higher than Hillside's.
Rather, Hillside merely argued that the litigation was not complex, and that Rite Aid
made inefficient use of its counsel.
Rite Aid replied that except for the amounts of the respective attorney fees, all of
Hillside's arguments
contained in Hillside's memorandum were contained in the previous
memoranda submitted last spring, as to which, the Court ruled that an
evidentiary hearing was appropriate to give Hillside the opportunity to
present evidence proving that Rite Aid's fees were inappropriate.
Otherwise, the Court ruled, Rite Aid had prima facie established its entitled
to the fees detailed and requested. Hillside has failed to meet its burden of
proving the inappropriateness of Rite Aid's fee request. This Court ruled
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

(

that Hillside had the burden to demonstrate the inappropriateness of Rite
Aid's fees through cross-examination or other testimony. Hillside chose
instead to waive an evidentiary hearing and the presentation of evidence.
Moreover, Hillside's memorandum is insufficient to meet its burden of
proof. It merely repeats the same mantra that Rite Aid's fee request is too
high, without providing any evidence to support its argument.
R. 1019 (emphasis in original).
In reply, Hillside again argued that the case was not complex, and that Rite Aid
made inefficient use of its counsel by hiring attorneys from separate law firms. On this
second issue, Hillside wrote: "Rite Aid's sole motive for hiring two law firms was that
both senior attorneys were experienced in the legal issues involved and both had
previously had done local work for Rite Aid. . . . This is Hillside's proof that the attorney
fees charged by Rite Aid are unreasonable." R. 1027 (emphasis in original). Hillside
never explained, however, why it is not objectionable for two attorneys in one firm to
work on a case (as Hillside's counsel did), but it is improper for one attorney in each of
two firms to work together.
In its December 20, 2002 Minute Entry, the trial court recited the history of the
attorney fee issue. Then wrote: "Hillside merely relies on its own assertion that the fees
requested are too high, without providing any evidence to support its argument."
(R.1035). With respect to Hillside's "objections", the trial court concluded "that these
factors prove nothing in terms of efficiency or reasonableness. Without more, Hillside's
opposition lacks any legal basis for the Court to reduce the amount of fees being sought"
(R. 1036).
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As stated above, the trial court was in the best position to gauge the complexity of
the litigation, the efficiency of the counsel, and the overall reasonability of an attorney
fee request. Richard Barton Enters, v. Tsern, 928 P.2d at 380. Moreover, "[w]here the
evidence supporting the reasonableness of requested attorney fees is both adequate and
entirely undisputed, as it was here, the court abuses its discretion in awarding less than
the amount requested unless the reduction is warranted by one or more of the factors
described in Dixie State Bank v. Bracken" Martindale v. Adams, 111 P.2d 514, 517-18
(UtahCt.App. 1989).
Given the circumstances described above and Hillside's utter failure to adduce any
factual or legal basis for its arguments, the trial court was well within its discretion in
making its attorney fee award to Rite Aid.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should AFFIRM the trial court's judgment in
all respects.
DATED: July /f,

2003

JONES WALDO HOLBROOK & MCDONOUGH, P.C.

Bruce Wycoff
j ^
Billie Siddoway
^
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellees
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IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
THRIFTY PAYLESS, INC., a
California corporation, d/b/a
RITE AID,
Plaintiff,
v.
HILLSIDE PLAZA LTD., a
California limited partnership,
d/b/a HILLSIDE PLAZA
PROPERTIES, and COLLIERS
PROPERTY MANAGEMENT, a Utah
general partnership,
Defendants.

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Civil No. 000910098
Judge Timothy R. Hanson

HILLSIDE PLAZA, LTD., a
California limited partnership
d/b/a/ HILLSIDE PLAZA
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PROPERTIES,
Plaintiff,
v.
THRIFTY PAYLESS, INC., a
California corporation d/b/a/
RITE AID; and AMERICAN DRUG
STORES, INC., an Illinois
corporation,
Defendants.

:
:
:
:
:
:
:

The Court conducted a bench trial of this matter beginning
March 18, 2002. Plaintiff/Counterdefendants, Thrifty Payless, Inc.
("Thrifty")and Rite Aid Corporation

("Rite Aid"),

along with

Counterdefendant American Drug Stores ("ADS") , appeared personally
and through their counsel of record, Cynthia K. C. Meyer of Morgan,
Meyer, and Rice, L.C., and Bruce Wycoff of Jones, Waldo, Holbrook
& McDonough.
("Hillside"),

Defendant/Counterclaimant, Hillside
appeared personally

and through

Plaza, Ltd.

its counsel of

record, Scott 0. Mercer and Ryan Hancey, of Kesler & Rust.
The Court, having heard the testimony of the witnesses, having
observed their demeanor and credibility, having carefully read the
trial memoranda submitted by the parties, and being fully apprised
in the matter, hereby enters the following Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law.
FINDINGS OF FACT
532686v2
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Parties
1.

Thrifty is a California Corporation with it principal

place of business in Cumberland County, Pennsylvania.
2.

Rite Aid is a Delaware Corporation with its principal

place of business in Cumberland County, Pennsylvania.
3.

Thrifty

Corporation.

is

a wholly

owned

subsidiary

of Rite Aid

(Hereafter, the Court will refer to Thrifty and Rite

Aid collectively as "Rite Aid").
4.

Hillside

is

a

California

limited

partnership

that

regularly conducts business in Salt Lake County, Utah.
5.

On or about May 6, 1974, Hillside Plaza Associates

("HPA"), as landlord, entered into a written Lease Agreement (the
"Lease"), with Skaggs Companies, Inc. ("Skaggs"), as tenant, in
which HPA leased to Skaggs retail space located at 2378 East 7000
South, Salt Lake City, Utah (the "Property")
6.

Rite Aid is the successor-in-interest to Skaggs.

7.

Hillside is the successor-in-interest to HPA.

8.

ADS,

a

previous

successor-in-interest

to

Skaggs,

guaranteed the performance under the Lease of any successors to,
assignees of, or subtenants under, its interests.
Factual Background
9.
532686v2
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to expire on January 31, 2001 unless Rite Aid gave Hillside timely
written notice of Rite Aid's intent to renew the Lease..
10.

At some point not disclosed by the record, Hillside hired

Commerce Properties Management Corporation

("CPMG") to perform

property management functions for the Property.
11.

On March 19, 1992, CPMG sent a form letter (Trial Exhibit

2) giving Rite Aid's predecessor-in-interest the following notice:
Many of you have continued to deliver rental payments and
other mail to our former address. Effective March 20,
1992 our brokerage company is moving from their location
at 275 East S. Temple to their new offices. In the
future all rental payments and mail for [CPMG] should be
addressed as follows:
Hillside Plaza Limited
Commerce Properties Management Corp.
5282 South 320 West, Suite D-100
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107
(Emphasis added)
12.

On September 2, 1996 Hillside Management, an assumed name

of an entity legally distinct from Hillside, which has no common
owners, sent a form letter

("Hillside's 1996 Letter")

Exhibit 3) to Rite Aid's predecessor-in-interest.

(Trial

Trial Exhibit 3

recites that "the property management responsibilities for Hillside
Plaza Shopping Center have been assumed by Annette Johnson of
Hillside Management."

Exhibit 3 contained the following notice:

For the month of September, 1996, [CPMG] will forward
532686V2
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your rental payment to Hillside Management*
mail your future rent payments as follows:

Please

Hillside Plaza Shopping Center
c/o Hillside Management
P.O. Box 900511
Sandy, Utah 84090
Your rental payments should be made in accordance with
the terms of your lease and must be received no later
than the date specified in your lease.
(Emphasis added)
13.

Although

Exhibit

3 was

not

sent

by

registered

or

certified mail, Rite Aid's predecessor-in-interest received and
acted on the letter soon after September 2, 1996, and placed the
letter in its lease file.
14.

Unlike Exhibit 2, Exhibit 3 gave no change of address

instructions for "mail" or "other mail".

It expressly limited the

address change to "rent" and "rental" payments.
15.

In fact, by the date of Exhibit 3, Hillside had relieved

CPMG of all property management duties, and had transferred all
those duties to Hillside Management, a legally separate entity from
Hillside.
16.

On March 21, 1997 Rite Aid wrote Hillside, requesting

that all future legal notices be sent to one address, and that all
future non-legal correspondence such as billings be sent to a
different address.
532686v2
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1

17.

Because Exhibit 4 was a legal notice, Rite Aid sent it to

the address it had used for general, non-rental, mail before
receipt of Exhibit 3: Hillside, c/o CPMG, 5282 South 320 West, Ste
D, Salt Lake City, Utah 841070000.
18.

Rite Aid's legal notice regarding its change of address

reached Hillside shortly after March 21, 1997.
19.

The Lease further provides, at 5(2):

OPTION TO EXTEND: Tenant, at its option may extend the
term of this Lease for not to exceed four separate and
additional consecutive periods of 5 years each. Each
such extension shall be exercised by giving written
notice to Landlord at least 180 days prior to the
expiration of the original term hereof or any such
extended term. Upon such exercise, this Lease and the
Lease Agreement shall be deemed to be extended without
the execution of any further lease of other instrument.
Consequently, Rite Aid had to give Landlord written notice of Rite
Aid's exercise of the Option, and renewal not later than August 4,
2000, the date 180 days before January 31, 2002.
20.

Accordingly,

on June 21, 2000, Rite Aid

sent, via

certified mail, return receipt requested, its notice of renewal of
the Lease (Trial Exhibit 5) to the same address it had used for its
March 21, 1997 letter (Exhibit 4): Hillside, c/o CPMG, 5282 South
320 West, Suite D, Salt Lake City, UT 84107.

532686v2

21.

CPMG received the letter on June 29, 2000.

22.

CPMG personnel "probably" or "likely" forwarded Exhibit
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att\

5 to Hillside Management.
23.

Sometime after the August

4, 2001 renewal date had

passed, Hillside, through counsel, advised Rite Aid's counsel,
Cynthia Meyer, that Rite Aid had failed to exercise the Option as
the Lease required.
24.

Trial Exhibit 55 contains a January 21, 1997 letter from

Annette Johnson of Hillside Management to Lu Strong of Rite Aid's
predecessor-in-interest (the "January 21, 1997 Letter").
25.

At trial, Hillside presented no competent evidence that

Hillside Management ever sent the January 21, 1997 Letter to Rite
Aid or to anyone else.
26.

Hillside offered no evidence nor excuse explaining or

justifying Annette Johnson's failure to testify at trial.
27.

The Court has great concern regarding the authenticity of

the January 21, 1997 Letter; in any event, Hillside has not met its
burden of proving that Hillside Management sent that letter. As a
result, the Court will disregard it.
Rite Aid Strictly Complied With Option Exercise Requirements
28.

In writing Exhibit 3, Hillside Management intended to

change the mailing address for all purposes from CPMG to Hillside
Management; Exhibit 3, however, does not express that intention.
29.
532686v2

Rite Aid was unaware of this intention until after August
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4, 2000, the deadline for Rite Aid's Option exercise,
30.

Because it changed the address for legal notice only on

its PIMS system, leaving the address for other correspondence
unchanged, it is clear that Rite Aid's predecessor-in-interest read
Exhibit 3 as changing the address
activities

only, leaving unaffected

for rent and rent-related
the address

contained in

Exhibit 2 for correspondence not involving rent and rent-related
activities.
31.

It is not uncommon in the commercial leasing industry for

landlords and tenants to establish multiple addresses for various
types of correspondence.
32.

The Phrase "property management" does not have any

standard or generally recognized meaning in the commercial leasing
industry.
33.

The phrase "property management" may or may not mean

"all" activities involving the managed property.
34.

Under the evidence admitted at trial, it is of really

small moment whether Rite Aid read Exhibit 3 or not prior to
sending Exhibit 5, because Exhibit 3 makes reference only to the
address for "rent", and not to other types of correspondence, and
therefore changed the address for rent only.
35.
532686v2
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the

address

for

rent

and

rent-related

correspondence

was

reasonable.
36.

Hillside presented no evidence establishing that Rite Aid

should be charged with knowledge of its or Hillside Management's
unexpressed intent.
37.

It would not have been difficult for Hillside Management

to have a written a letter that clearly and unequivocally changed
the address for all types of notice; indeed its purported January
21, 1997 Letter accomplished that purpose.
38.

The Court is not impressed with Hillside's arguments that

it repeatedly sent correspondence to Rite Aid containing the Sandy
post office box address because such correspondence was rentrelated, and in many cases merely requested that Rite Aid remit
monies to the listed address.
39.

To the extent Hillside wanted Rite Aid to correct the

address it was using, Hillside provided no explanation of its
failure ever to send any change of address notice to Rite Aid at
the address it had specified in Exhibit 4 as applying to legal
notices (Attention: Secretary, Post Office Box 3165, Harrisburg,
Pennsylvania) .
Mistake

40.
532686v2
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inconsistent with Hillside Management's intention.
41.

Hillside Management prepared Exhibit 3.

42.

The change-of-address portion of Exhibit 3 deals only

1
with ''rent'" or "rental".
43.

Hillside Management accordingly caused any confusion

inherent in Exhibit 3.
44.

It is not reasonable under the circumstances to charge

Rite Aid with knowledge of what wras in Hillside Management's mind.
45.

.

To the extent Rite Aid addressed Exhibit 5 to the wrong

address, that error was the result of a honest and justifiable
mistake in interpreting Exhibit 3.
46.

(

No trial evidence showed that Rite Aid was negligent in

exercising the Option to renew the Lease.
The Court, having entered its Findings of Fact, now enters the

*

following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
4
Having made the foregoing factual findings, the Court has
determined that they support the following legal conclusions, or
that it is appropriate to make the following conclusions as a
i

matter of law:
1.

This Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this

matter and personal jurisdiction over the parties.
532686v2
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2.

At trial, Hillside relied on The January 21, 1997 Letter

which, as a matter of law, would have been dispositive of the
issues at trial in favor of Hillside if Hillside could establish
that it sent it to Rite Aid's predecessor, and that Rite Aid's
predecessor had received it.
3.

The

burden

is

on

Hillside

to

show

that

Hillside

Management sent the January 21, 1997 Letter; the burden is not on
Rite Aid to show that Hillside Management did not send it or that
Rite Aid's predecessor did not receive it.
4.

There is no presumption of mailing; to the contrary the

law is explicit regarding the evidence necessary to establish
mailing.
5.

The January 21, 1997 Letter is legally entitled to no

weight.
6.

The effectiveness of Exhibit 5 to exercise Rite Aid's

option to renew the Lease (the "Option") therefore rises or falls
with Exhibit 3.
7.

As

the

January

21,

1997

Letter

shows,

Hillside

Management, as the agent for Hillside, had the ability to express
in Exhibit 3 with reasonable clarity what Hillside Management
intended.
8.
532686v2
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having multiple addresses for different purposes.
9.

Rite Aid was obligated to strictly comply with the

Lease's Option and renewal provisions.
10.

By sending Exhibit 5 to the address it did, Rite Aid

strictly complied with the Lease's Option and renewal provisions;
if Rite Aid had sent Exhibit 5 to Hillside Management at the
address shown in Exhibit 3, Hillside could have argued that Rite
Aid had not strictly complied with Exhibit 3.
11.

Exhibit 3 does not substantially comply with the Lease's

provisions for changing the address for legal notices because it
changes the address for rent only.
12.

Alternatively, to the extent Rite Aid was mistaken in its

interpretation of Exhibit 3, that mistake is equitably excused
under the foregoing factual circumstances.
13.

Exhibit 3 is not ambiguous.

to the new address.

It says send rent payments

Rite Aid did that.
CONCLUSION AND ORDER

Based upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of
law, the Court orders as follows:
1.

Rite Aid effectively renewed the Lease for an additional

five-year term.
2.
532686v2
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of the Property to the extent set forth in the Lease.
3.

Hillside shall take nothing by its Complaint. All claims

that Hillside raised, or could have raised through the date of the
trial in this matter, are hereby dismissed with prejudice and on
the merits.
4.

The Third District Court Clerk shall immediately release

all cash or possession bonds Rite Aid has filed or deposited with
the Clerk in connection with these consolidated actions.
5.

The

Court

expressly

reserves

ruling

on Rite Aid's

entitlement to attorney fees, and amount of those fees, until Rite
Aid has properly brought the matter before the Court pursuant to
the provisions of Utah Rule of Judicial Administration 4-505.
6.

Pursuant to ProMax Development

Corp.

v.

Raile,

998 P.2d

254, 1 15 (Utah 2000), this Order is not final for purposes of
appeal until this Court has disposed of the reserved attorney fee
issue
DATED: 4(pr±l-

, 2002,
BY THE/COURT

'imothy R. H,
Third District Court Judge

r
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?a(^r

-March, 19 19^^

-Q Cor- ?ayi ass 3330
S275 SW Peyton Lane
Wilsonville, CH 37070
He:

Change of Adcres
Rental Payments

Dear Tenants and Business ?.s: o c i a t s s ,
l o c a t e c i r r a w r i 4 i t ^ d - S f S ^ i ?r B° p o 5 * \ E. e su r Management h a s b e e n
Commerce P r o p e r ^ e s " f l ?
I ^
?^^? ^
! b r o k e r a g e ccmoany,
r e n t a l payments i l l o t a ^ m ^ V * yUor u .f ch ra v ee r t i n n e d t c d e l i v e r
-March 2 0 , 1392 o u r hr-nt
° °
™
address.
Effective
y
* t 275 E a s t J . ? e m p " 7 o % \ r m P a a W
" ^£xf "l 0c "e 1a 1 1 9 f " ™ t h e i r l o c a t i o n
r e n t a l payments
X w Q
! "
«
-.
^ the future all
Commercs
be a d d r e s s e d a s followV:
P r o p e r t i e s Management s h o u l d
H i l l s i d e Plaza Limited
- T
;; ccjranerce P r o p e r t i e s Management Corp.
^ 8 ^ South 320 West, S u i t e D-1Q0
S a l t Lake C i t y , UT 84107
''
y
^ - W ^ b l 1 . 7 t c ^ S * ™ ^ ^ " ^ VSXlt
T ! * • < * * ^ o u l d NOT be
made p a y a b l e t o t * e b u s A p ? , nl
- }•
^
P a ^ ^ t s s h o u l d be
inSS3 name
r t::e
r e f e r e n c e d above
°
P r o p e r t y you occupy as

If you have any q u e s t i o n s c r i f we can be of
a s s i s t a n c e i n any way,,
p l e a s e do not h e s i t a t e t o c o n t a c t
your p r o p e r t y m a n a g e r . Thank you
f o r your c o o p e r a t i o n .

*.or^ Eawcen
A s s i s t a n t 3*-o"*s>-*«, M - ^ - '

MAR ^

:

if
.;v;;.

PLAINTIFF'S
EXHIBIT

B92

'^LwCi v C J

ALL-STATE* INTERNATIONAL
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SEP 0 6f3S5

HUlside Management
P.O. Box 900511
Sandy, Utah 84090
801-047^130

September 2> I996

Christopher Sloan
Property Accounting
Thrifty PayLess, Inc.
9275 S: W.Peyton Lane
Wilsorrville' OR 97070
Re;

S^
W

'" Hillside Plaza^Shopping "Center
PayLess S#re#353£

Dear Ms. Hammer,,
Effective September I. 1996, the property management responsibilities for;Hillside Plaza \
Shopping Center have been assumed by Annette Johnson of Hillside Management. With
the organization of HUlside-Management, and with the assignment of this-responsibility to
Annette, we should be able to ensure a high level of attention to the needs of the tenants .
of Hillside Plaza. Annette can be reached at 801-947-91.30.. •
For the month of September, 1996," Commerce Properties Management Corp. wiil forward
your rental payment to Hillside Management. Please mail your future rent payments as
follows:
"••'•..••.
Hillside Plaza Shopping Center
c'oHilhideManagement • •
; P.O.. Box 900511 . • ' • ' • "
; Sandy, UT. 84090 . . ; . • / .
Your rental payments should he made in accordance with the terms of your lease and must
be received' no later than the due date specified' in.your lease. .*
You may be aware that the ownership of Hillsida Plaza has recently refinanced its loan for
the shopping earner. In accordance with the.terms of this new loan, several "caprtai
. improvement and repair projects wiil be underway during this fail and next spring. The
most significant capital improvement projects include: the planned addition of new sign
bands above the northeast ±ops and above the plaza shops: and'extensive-renovations to
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C h r i s t o p h e r Sloan . . . ' . . • '
' S e p t e m b e r 25 1996 . ' •
"Page 2

'

•

.

.•..•,•'•"•

/
•' •
/

•'..

' • • • •

' .•'•
'..

"-.

"'.:.•
'

'\

'

• the plaza area. At this time architects', are in the process of designing: the renovations.
Upon completion of the planning phase Tve will encourage interested tenants "to-review the
plans. The most significant repair projects.'include: paridng lot work; roof work; and
landscape improvements scheduled for next spring. We will make, every effort to minimize.
any inconvenience these projects may present for tenants and shopping center patrons.
Your input will be -welcome both now and during the course of the projects.- We. are
certain you will be-please with- the end result.
Thank you in advance lor your coopenrtion. If Annette can be of assistance in any way7
please do not hesitate to contact her

John S. Johnson'
Asset Manager

;c. RobBirdsley
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LEASE

THIS LEASE is m a c e and entered into as of the 6 m day --'
*y
_ , 1974, b e t w e e n HILLSIDE PLAZA . . S S C C I A T E S " a 3 a r l - . = r ship ( " L a n d l o r d " ) / a n d S K A G O S COMPANIES, INC., a D e : ^ a r e c o r - ^ - - "
("Tenant").
M

F o r a n d in c o n s i d e r a t i o n of the sum of Ten Dollars ($10.00) and
other good a n d v a l u a b l e c o n s i d e r a t i o n paid by Tenant to L a n d l o r d , the r e c e i c :
and sufficiency of w h i c h a r e h e r e b y acknowledged by L a n d l o r d , L a n d l o r d
h e r e b y l e a s e s a n d l e t s to T e n a n t a n d T e n a n t h e r e b y rents from L a n d l o r d u c c r .
and subject to all of the t e r m s and conditions set forth h e r e i n and in that c e r t a i n
s e p a r a t e a g r e e m e n t b e t w e e n L a n d l o r d and Tenant of even date h e r e w i t h ( t h e
"Lease A g r e e m e n t " ) , the p r e m i s e s at 70th South and 22rd East, Salt L a k e C o u n t y ,
Utah, c o n s i s t i n g of the outlined l a n d a r e a shaded in rec and m a r k e d " S k a g g s J
on the plot p l a n a t t a c h e d h e r e t o as E x h i b i t "A" and by r e f e r e n c e made a o a r :
hereof, t o g e t h e r w i t h all e a s e m e n t s , r i g h t s of way and a p p u r t e n a n c e s i n c o n n e c tion t h e r e w i t h o r t h e r e u n t o b e l o n g i n g and the building (with o u t s i d e d i m e n s i o n s
of 175 feet by 160 feet and a total g r o u n d floor s q u a r e footage of 23,000 ) and
other i m p r o v e m e n t s c o n s t r u c t e d or to be constructed thereon (all of w h i c h
are h e r e i n a f t e r r e f e r r e d to as the " P r e m i s e s " ) , the same being a p o r t i o n of
a shopping c e n t e r ( t h e "Shopping Center-"), Lhc p r e s e n t b u u . i d a r i c s of w h i c h
are more p a r t i c u l a r l y described
on E x h i b i t "B" attached h e r e t o and by r e f e r e n c e
made a p a r t h e r e o f . In a d d i t i o n , T e n a n t and its i n v i t e e s , c u s t o m e r s and e m p l o y e e s
shall h a v e t h e u s e i n common with L a n d l o r d and other tenants of L a n d l o r d a n d
t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e i n v i t e e s , c u s t o m e r s , and employees of the p o r t i o n s of the
Shopping C e n t e r ( a n d any e n l a r g e m e n t thereof) not now or hereafter o c c u p i e d
by b u i l d i n g s for p u r p o s e s of p a r k i n g motor v e h i c l e s , loading and u n l o a d i n g .
i n g r e s s and e g r e s s to the P r e m i s e s and p e d e s t r i a n walkways and s i d e w a l k s
(all of w h i c h a r e h e r e i n a f t e r r e f e r r e d to as the "Common A.reas") . No b u i l d i n g
or other i m p r o v e m e n t s shall be e r e c t e d or placed on that portion of the C o m m o n
Areas w h i c h is c r o s s m a t c h e d in g r e e n and marked "Common Area O n l y " on
Exhibit " A , " n o r s h a l l any b u i l d i n g or other improvement be e r e c t e d or d a c e d
in the S h o p p i n g C e n t e r or a n y e n l a r g e m e n t thereof which would d e c r e a s e to
less than t h e e x i s t i n g p a r k i n g ratio as indicated on Exhibit "A", of s q u a r e
footage u s e d for v e h i c u l a r p a r k i n g and roadways in the Shopping C e n t e r w i t n o u t
T e n a n t ' s p r i o r w r i t t e n consent; p r o v i d e d , h o w e v e r , that if the d o o r on the n o r i n west side of t h e b u i l d i n g on the P r e m i s e s is permanently closed b y T e n a n t , L a n e lord s h a l l h a v e the r i g h t to extend t h e east wmg of the shops located to t h e w e s t
of the P r e m i s e s so t h a t the n o r t h b u i l d i n g line thereof is flush with the front of
the b u i l d i n g on the P r e m i s e s .
(1) T E R M . T h e p r e l i m i n a r y term of this Lease s h a l l c o m m e n c e
with the d a t e of t h i s Leaie' and e x t e n d until the date oi the c o m m e n c e m e n t
of the o r i g i n a l t e r m as defined m the article of the Lease A g r e e m e n t e n t i t l e d
"COMMENCEMENT OF ORIGINAL TERM." The original term of this L e a s e
shall commence u p o n the e x p i r a t i o n date of said p r e l i m i n a r y term a n d s h a : ;
expire at m i d n i g h t on J a n u a r y 31 following the expiration of t w e n t y - f i v e ( 2 o )
y e a r s from t h e commencement of s a i d original t e r m .
If the o r i g i n a l term of this Lease h a s not commenced on o r
before J u l y 1, 1975 by the o c c u r r e n c e of such events as h e r e i n a b o v e r e q u i r e d ,
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-2T e n a n t may t e r m i n a t e this Lease and the Lease A g r e e m e n t by g i v i n g w r i t t e n
notice thereof to L a n d l o r d .
If the o r i g i n a l term has not commenced on
or before F e b r u a r y 1, 1976, this Lease and the Lease A g r e e m e n t shall a u t o matically t e r m i n a t e without notice u n l e s s T e n a n t h a s t h e r e t o f o r e o c c u p i e d
the P r e m i s e s and o p e n e d for b u s i n e s s t h e r e o n in w h i c h e v e n t T e n a n t may t e r m i n ate this Lease a n d the Lease Agreement by giving notice thereof to L a n d l o r d
and v a c a t i n g the P r e m i s e s .
(2) OPTION TO EXTEND. T e n a n t , at its o p t i o n , may e x t e n d
the term of this Lease for not to e x c e e d four s e p a r a t e and a d d i t i o n a l c o n s e c u tive p e r i o d s of 5 y e a r s e a c h . Each s u c h e x t e n d e d term s h a l l be on the
same t e r m s a n d conditions and at the same r e n t set forth in this Lease
and in the Lease A g r e e m e n t . Each s u c h e x t e n s i o n s h a l l be e x e r c i s e d by
g i v i n g w r i t t e n notice to Landlord at l e a s : 180 d a y s p r i o r to the e x p i r a t i o n
of the o r i g i n a l term hereof or any s u c h e x t e n d e d t e r m . Upon s u c h e x e r c i s e ,
this Lease and the Lease Agreement s h a l l be d e e m e d to be e x t e n d e d w i t h o u t
the e x e c u t i o n of any f u r t h e r lease or o t h e r i n s t r u m e n t .
(3) INTERPRETATION. In the event of any conflict b e r w e e n the
terms of this Lease a n d the Lease A g r e e m e n t , the Lease A g r e e m e n : s h a l l p r e v a i l .
All of the r i g h t s and obligations of the p a r t i e s u n d e r this Lease shall b i n d and
the b e n e f i t s s h a l l i n u r e to their r e s p e c t i v e h e i r s , legal r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s , s u c c e s s o r s
and a s s i g n s .
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, this Lease h a s b e e n e x e c u t e d as of the
day a n d y e a r f i r s t above w r i t t e n .
HILLSIDE PLAZA ASSOCIATES ,
a partnership

C"

^hr-

'<Tc

General Partner
LANDLORD

SKAGGS COMPANIES, INC.

By
It;

ML

l/V\^\

TENANT
ATTEST-:
-^a

O^f
Secretary

[CQRPQRATE SEAL]
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EXH1BIT "B"
H e r e i n s e r t the legal d e s c r i p t i o n of the e n t i r e S h o p p i n g C e n t e r .
Begining at the Southeast corner of the intersection of 7000 South and 2300
East Streets, said point being South 0°14'40" West 33.00 feet and South 89°
51'30" East 33.00 feet from rhe North quarter corner of Section 27, Township
2 South, Range 1 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, and running thence South
89° 51 '30" East along the South line of 7000 South Street 1085.00 feet to a
point of a 15.00 foot radius curve to the right; thence Easterly and Southerly
along the arc of said curve 23.56 feet to a point of tangency on the West line
of Promenade Drive; thence South 0°08'30" West along said West line 102.52
{ee\ to a point of a 15.00 foot radius curve to the right; thence Southwesterly
along the arc of said curve 22.51 feet to a point of a reverse curve to the
left on the North line of Gnnebar Lane, the radius point of said curve being
South 3 ° 5 r 3 0 " East 200.00 feet; thence Southwesterly along the arc of said
curve and North line 124.41 feet; thence North 39°30' West 105.19 feet;
thence South 39°10' West 243.69 feer; thence South 4 5 0 n , 3 5 " West 720.00
feet; thence South 66°22'30" West 102.47 feet; thence North 89°45'20" West
150.00 feet to the East line of 2300 East Street; thence North 0°14'40" East
along said East line 336.00 feet to the poinr of begining.
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LEASE

THIS LEASE is m a c e and entered into as of the Stn dav c:
y
_. 1974, b e t w e e n HILLSIDE PLAZA ASSOCIATES? a par^ris.—
ship ( " L a n d l o r d " ) , and SKAGGS COMPANIES, INC., a Delaware c o r — -"&•• ("Tenant").
** *
Ma

For and in c o n s i d e r a t i o n ot the sum of Ten Dollars ($10.00) and
other good and v a l u a b l e c o n s i d e r a t i o n paid by Tenant to Landlord, the r e c e i p t
and sufficiency of w h i c h are h e r e b y acknowledged by Landlord, Landlord
hereby l e a s e s and l e t s to Tenant and Tenant hereby rents from Landlord upon
and subject to all of the terms and conditions set forth herein and in that certa.r.
separate a g r e e m e n t b e t w e e n Landlord and Tenant of even date herewith (the
"Lease A g r e e m e n t " ) , the p r e m i s e s at 70th South and 22rd East, Salt Lake C o u n t y ,
Utah, c o n s i s t i n g of the outlined land area shaded in TQC and marked "Skaggs*-'
on the plot p l a n attached hereto as Exhibit "A" and by reference made a part
hereof, together w i t h all e a s e m e n t s , rights of way and appurtenances in c o n n e c tion therewith or thereunto b e l o n g i n g and the building (with outside d i m e n s i o n s
of 175 feet by 160 feet and a total ground floor square footage of 23,000 ) and
other i m p r o v e m e n t s c o n s t r u c t e d or to be constructed thereon (all of w h i c h
are hereinafter r e f e r r e d to as the "Premises"), the same being a portion of
a shopping c e n t e r ( t h e "Shopping Center"), the present boundaries of w h i c h
are more p a r t i c u l a r l y d e s c r i b e d on Exhibit "B" attached hereto and by r e f e r e n c e
made a p a r t h e r e o f . In a d d i t i o n , Tenant and its invitees, customers and err.plcyees
shall have the u s e in common w i t h Landlord and other tenants of Landlord a n their r e s p e c t i v e i n v i t e e s , c u s t o m e r s , and employees of the portions of the
Shopping Center ( a n d any e n l a r g e m e n t thereof) not now or hereafter o c c u p i e d
by b u i l d i n g s for p u r p o s e s of p a r k i n g motor vehicles, loading and u n l o a d i n g ,
i n g r e s s and e g r e s s to the P r e m i s e s and pedestrian walkways and s i d e w a l k s
(all of which are h e r e i n a f t e r r e f e r r e d to as the "Common Areas") . No b u i l d i n g
or other i m p r o v e m e n t s shall be e r e c t e d or placed on that portion of the Comrr.cr.
Areas w h i c h i s c r o s s h a t c h e d in g r e e n and marked "Common Area Only" on
Exhibit "A," nor s h a l l any b u i l d i n g or other improvement be erected or p l a c e d
in the S h o p p i n g Center or any enlargement thereof which would d e c r e a s e to
l e s s than the e x i s t i n g p a r k i n g ratio as indicated on Exhibit "A", of s q u a r e
footage u s e d for v e h i c u l a r p a r k i n g and roadways in the Shopping Center without
Tenant's p r i o r w r i t t e n consent; p r o v i d e d , however, that if the door on the n o r t h west side of the b u i l d i n g on the P r e m i s e s is permanently closed by T e n a n t , L a n d lord shall h a v e the right to e x t e n d the east wing of the shops located to the w e s ;
of the P r e m i s e s so that the north building line thereof is flush with the front o:
the building on the P r e m i s e s .
(1) TERM. The p r e l i m i n a r y term of this Lease shall commence
with the date of this L'eaW and e x t e n d until the date of the commencement
of the o r i g i n a l term as defined m the article of the Lease Agreement entitled
"COMMENCEMENT OF ORIGINAL TERM." The original term of this Lease
shall commence u p o n the e x p i r a t i o n date of said preliminary term and s n a i l
expire at m i d n i g h t on January 31 following the expiration of tv/enty-five (25)
years from the commencement of s a i d original term.
If the original term of this Lease has not commenced on or
before July 1, 1975 by the o c c u r r e n c e of such events as hereinabove r e q u i r e d ,
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EXH1BIT »B"
Here insert the legal description of the entire Shopping Center.
Begining at the Southeast corner of the intersection of 7000 South and 2300
East Streets, said point being South 0 o l4'40 n West 33.00 feet and South 89°
5r30" East 33.00 feet from rhe North quarter corner of Section 27, Township
2 South, Range 1 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, and running thence South
89° 51 'SO" East along the South line of 7000 South Street 1085.00 feet to a
point of a 15.00 foot radius curve to the right; thence Easterly and Southerly
along the arc of said curve 23.56 feet to a point of tangency on the West line
of Promenade Drive; thence South 0°08'30M West along said West line 102.52
feet to a point of a 15.00 foot radius curve to the right; thence Southwesterly
along the arc of said curve 22.51 feet to a point of a reverse curve to the
left on the North line of Cinnebar Lane, the radius point of said curve being
South 3°5r30" East 200.00 feet; thence Southwesterly along the arc of said
curve and North line 124.41 feet; thence North 39°30* West 105.19 feet;
thence South G^IO' West 243.69 feet; thence South 45°11,35" West 720.00
feet; thence South 66o22,30" West 102.47 feet; thence North a W S ' ^ " West
150.00 feet to the East line of 2300 East Street; thence North 0o14,40" East
along said East line 336.00 feet to the point of begining.
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